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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
HABERMAS-RELATED SECOND GENERATION
OF THE FRANKFU·RT SCHOOL:
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
Richard R. Weiner
University ofNorth Florida
The tradition of the Critical Theory of Society developed by
the Frankfurt.. School has been renewed by a second. generation.
_Most prominent among them is JurgenHabermas and his colleagues
Karl Otto Apel and Alfred Schmidt. Also of significance are both
the dialogues and debates between Habermas and his students:
Claus Offe, Oskar Negt and Bernard Willms.
The specific themes argued by the Frankfurt School diverge
from their chosen paradigm-Marx's critique ofpolitical economy.
Fundamentally, Critical Theory radically revised the terms of
Marx's analysis, redirecting its focus from the infra-structure to
the superstructure, replacing the critique of political economy
with the critique of instrwnental rationality. They sought to
perceive simultaneously the combined effects of constitutive
objective-historical conditions of domination and constituting
subjective-intentionality of practical reasoning.
For the Frankfurt School, the existing relations of
production came to be seen as that form of organization which is
technically necessary ~~:r.: a rational. society, while all social
problems had been made to seem to be questions of technical
adjustment. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and
Adorno emphasize the emergent modern conflict between two
concepts of reason. Practical reason is grounded in deliberation
and dialogue over the conditions of the good life. Instrumental
reason is found in the technical control of nature.
In this vein Habermas distinguishes between instrumental and
communicative action. In instrumental action we encounter
objects the paradigm for which are moving bodies, capable of
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manipulation. In communicative action we encounter objects the
paradigm for which are speaking and acting subjects,
understandable through symbols.
Habermas' theory of communicative competence or universal
pragmatics makes use of a fundamentally hermeneutic critique of
systematically distorted messages. Now, in accentuating the
mediation of traditions through dialogue, the hermeneutics of
Hans-Georg Gadamer has gone beyond the Wittgensteinian notion
of the language game by distancing traditions to the point of
ineffability, foreclosing the possibility of subjecting them to
rational critique. Consequently, Habermas rejects a purely
hermeneutic analysis of the. Gadamerian sort, but only because it
does not critically demystify the distorted and distorting
structures of the objective constitutive terms.
For Habermas, we must somehow break free from the
disguised authoritarian control of our managed societies by
exposing scientism and making real again a public sphere
(offentlichkeit) in which citizens can engage in rational discourse
about their needs and can collectively, and with enlightened
understanding, decide on their common aims.
For Habermas, the constituting character of practical
reasoning describes the intersubjective, ergo, intercommunicable
mediation within the public communicative sphere of practical
consciousness. Such practical conscious activity confronts us with
our "constitutive self-formation of the existing" rules of the game
in order to recognize the immanent possibilities objectively
present.
-Habermas' theory of communicative competence or universal
p.ragmatics.(~.e., dialogue constitutive universals) attempts to
include intersubjective hermeneutic consciousness and validity
claims (Wahrheitsbezug) within a more objectively rationalistic
ideal typical analysis. Yet it is an approach which doesn't attempt
to achieve objectivity in the sense in which the term is used in the
natural sciences (i.e., not as a result of a process of objectivation) ,
nor in the sense of some sort of permanent knowledge. Rather it
seeks to appreciate the intersubjective, i.e., intercornmunicable ,
mediation of constituting practical reasoning and its constitutive
objective-historical constraints as a "text". It seeks to understand
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such a text in terms of the grammar of a language game rooted in a
set of contextually specific generative rules-rules invoked to
legitimate or evaluate some course of action. In constructing this
theory, Habermas stresses subsequent sustained and careful
concrete empirical research to ascertain the likelihood of
alternatively constituted possibilities being realized.
Habennas' theory of communicative competence or universal
pragmatics takes its departure from the notion of a smoothly
functioning language game which rests on a background consensus.
This consensus is conceived as being based on the mutual
recognition of various kinds of validity claims which are implied in
all speech acts. Habennas' idea of communicative competence is
derived from the Austin-Searle tradition of linguistic philosophy.
Following Searle, he designates the speech act as the elementary
unit of intersubjective, i.e., intercommunicative, mediation within
the public sphere of practical consciousness. The speech act is a
projection ... not merely a symbol, a word or a sentence. Nor is it
a token of a symbol of a word or of a sentence. Rather, the speech
act is "the production or issuance of a sentence token under
certain conditions."
Habermas argues that a smoothly functioning language game
rests on a background consensus formed from the mutual
recognition of at least four different types of validity claims
r;eltungsanspruche) which are involved in the exchange of speech
acts: the claims that the utterance is understandable and that its
propositional content is true, and the claims that the speaker is
authentic (Wahrhaftig) in uttering it, and that it is right or
appropriate(richtig)for him to be performing the speech act which
he performs,
Thus, Habermas' redefinition of Critical Theory starts with"
communicative action in which these implicitly raised validity
claims are naively accepted, but focuses in on those emergent
situations in which one or more of these validity claims becomes
problematical. Such a problematic develops when the background
consensus-that is, the accepted framework of opinions and
norms-is called into question and the claims which were
previously only implicit, now require discursive justification. For
Habermas, the validity of problematic truth claims or of
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problematic norms can be redeemed only by entering into a
discourse which has the purpose of judging the truth of the
problematic opinion or the correctness of the problematic norm
(Legitimationproblem) .
Such "pratical discourse"-as opposed to a purely theoretical
one-involves. the supposition by the participants that they are in
an "ideal speech situation": that they are discussing under
conditions which guarantee that the consensus which is arrived at
will be the result of the force of the better argument and not of
the constraints on the discussion. Thus, for Habermas, the
requirements of the ideal speech situation are such that the
conditions for ideal discourse are connected with conditions for an
ideal form of social life: one in which a.utonomy and responsibility
are possible as inherent in the structure of social action, that is, a
structure of speech.
For Haberrnas, the critical theorist makes the counter-factual
assumption and then asks: what would each member of a society
think if he or she was completely aware of the situation, free and
able to verbalize the occluded aspects of social life, and could ask
whether his or her empirical ,interests were or were not
universalizable? From this counter-factual question, it becomes
possible to show both the functional necessity for the system to
legitimate itself ideologically, and at the same time, to indicate the
possible forms of critique of that ideology.
To avoid the relativism and the contingency of empirical
social referents which could change at any time, and to avoid the
ahistoricality of a fixed notion of truth outside the sphere of
human . relations, Habermas moved beyond-the position of
Knowledge and Human Interests and Theory and Practice where
the question of the validity of social norms and the truth of
metatheoretical statements is concerned.
In his recent attempts at a theory of social evolution
("Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"),
Habermas continues in his quest to make possible a notion of
collective practical reasoning. (or "Social Praxis") which is not
contingent, but rather truth-oriented and open to discursive
questioning. He differentiates tasks of critical theory from the
domain of a theory of social evolution: the Konstitution frage
from the Warhrheitsbezug.
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Thus, critical theory is understood as referring to the
constitution of the life-world, that is, it makes up the categorical
meanings which provide the content of a statement. A theory of
social evolution refers to the validity-claim constituted by the
intersubjective element in the perfonnative aspect of the speech
act. The first focuses on the subjective/objective frame of
reference, whereas the second fastens on the intersubjective and
the mediate in the discourse of all potential participants. The
former is bound to a monological action context, while the latter
is concerned with the reconstruction of universal and anonymous
systems of rates within the context of a discourse removed from
practical imperatives. The "self-reflexion" achieved by the former
has practical consequences, whereas the attempt to ground
Habermas' dialogue-constitutive universals in a theory of social
evolution aims at the transcendental: a transcendental critique of
language to reveal the transcendental foundation of
species-activity.
Habermas' theory of communicative competence/universal
pragmatics describes the grammar of a language game as being
rooted in a set of contextually specific generative rules: the public
sphere and its social rules. In such a Kommunicationsgemeinschaft
model speakers are treated as if they followed rules in confronting
and negotiating particular action situations. Location of and
knowledge of such rules constitute them as competent speakers.
The intention of Habennas' theoretical endeavors is to
distinguish an "accepted consensus" or legitimation
("Hegemony") from the "rational consensus" of the ideal speech
situation ("Truth"). His purpose-in line with the tradition of
Critical Theory-sis to renew the classical quest for that ideal form
of life where objective social institutions and practices can exist
that permit free, responsible and non-ideological social discourse
in which we can collectively constitute community: the
Kommunicationsgemeinschaft.
Habermas' endeavors assume: (1) that normative rules cannot
be divorced from the interactional settings in which meanings are
attributed to objects and events; (2) that a rule-governed structure
transcends the actual performance of speech acts; (3) that
interpretation is required to recognize the abstract rule which fits
87
_ ..~..
Mid-American Review of Sociology
a particular performance; and (4) that every attempt to describe
the structure of language relies on practical reasoning.
The theorizing of Habennas points sociologists necessarily to.
many of the conceptual tools developed by the mo~e inte:pretive
modes of sociology, specifically those bent on discovering the
fundamental normative ordering in the performance of speech
acts. There is an insistance here on understanding human action
with reference to the interpersonally shared meaning that action
has for agents, particularly the interpretive procedures (e.g.,
Cicourel), accounting procedures (e.g., Scott and Lyman) and
common frames of reference (belief systems, ideologies,
symbolically mediated understandings, moral paradigms, and
traditions) interpersonally employed. This emphasis, however, is
not a license for unbridled subjectivism. One of the dominant
themes in analytic philosophy has been that language and human
action are rooted in (1) interpersonal, that is, intersubjective
contexts of communication, and (2) intersubjective practices and
forms of life (cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
Paragraph 23).
The hermeneutic sociological. theorizing suggested by
Habermas and Apel is directed toward understanding interaction:
the participation of actors in an intersubjective "form ~~~fe". ~y
"form of life" we denote (1) "a matrix of human acnvities WIth
point, purpose and regularity", and (2) "what people do, as they
comment upon, reflect upon and formulate what they perform"
(Clegg, p. 36). These activities and utterances are manifested in
some logic-in-use, a public language. .
We -are .led ..... to investigate a .public language .rooted m "
institutions and practices, common meanings, and collective
identities. Similarly we 'are led to the study of intersubjective
capabilities: predispositions, biographies, organizable resources,
degree of communicative competency, and the strategy of
practical reasoning.
In Habermas' communications theory the notion of the
"negotiated creativeness" of practical reasoning underlines the
actors' reliance on normative rules for fmding and justifying the
meaning of events as socially organized. The learning and
application of such general rules or norms and their long term.
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storage require interpretive and accounting procedures £
recognizing and standardizing the relevance of actual, chan .or
action-situations, orienting the actor to possible courses ofact~
Th · . d on.e interpretive proce ures orient us to the normal "forms f
life" that constitute our social reality; they provide us with°a
devel~pmenta11! changing sense of social structures, enabling one
to assign meanmg or relevance to an environment of objects of
reference. In this sense it retains a Weberian tone in its continued
"indexicality", i.e., its reference to objects described in contextual
terms and bound to their occasioned use. Indexicality implies
knowledge that is in some way ordered or organized according to
some rationale.
Cicourel (1973:44, 76-81, 107-111) refers to the rules
underlying our performance of speech acts as "surface rules"
(surface structure). However, "indexical" concerns with the
underlying rules that both structure speech and "index" cognition
and thought require the attribution of meaning beyond the surface
form. They point to that which is labelled the "depth structure"
or grammar of a particular language ... and beyond to the
dominant principle(s) [what Hahermas refers to as the
"fundamental organizing constitutive principle"] that provide the
~atricesor parameters to some public language.
For Habermas "practical activity" is oriented to some
"order" " ""h ical fr, or structure WIt a grammati system a
"organizing" rules. Legitimations or accounts shape the way in
which a subject interprets his experiences and the social
regularities he fmds; they presuppose cognitive construction of the
self, of some collectivity, and of the environmenral field of action.
The~e cognitive constructs provide "rationales" for the
self-reflexive consciousness. They enable the actor to discover
"good" reasons for accounting for some action as legitimate or
not.
Ultimately, Habermas, theorizing remains-beyond the
concerns of more purely interpretive modes of sociology-linked
to the original paradigm of the Frankfurt School, the Marxian
critique of political economy. For Habermas never fails to assume
that certain material conditions will be necessary for the telos of
the discursively achieved consensus to be concretely realized and
objectively constituted.
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INTER.SUBJECfIVITY: Sprache ... language
e.g., indexical expressions ..... "depth structures".. "surface ..
structures"
Constituting .. "accounts"
practical
reasoning
SUBJECfIVITY
Interpretive
procedures
OBJECfIVITY: Constitutive rules, e.g., dominant fundamental
"constitutive organizing principle"
(Derived-'from HABERMAS:' Zur Entwicklung"der In teraktionskompetenz
(Frankfurt a.M./April1975), pp. 8-9).
NORMATIVITY: Gessellscha]t (Society). e.g., Constitutional
rules, Conventional rules
These systems of rules make up that which Habermas refers
to as the "background" or "accepted" consensus: what the
ethnomethodologists label the "background assumptions" of
everyday life (Giddens:123-24,127). They provide the contexts of
meaning with which to understand attempted communication
(Habermas' practical cognitive interest), the operation of control
(Habennas' technical cognitive interest), or moral relations
(Habennas' emancipatory cognitive interest).
The emergent theoretical corpus of Habermas and Apel, as
well as recent developments in interpretive sociology, can be
understood as yielding the following summary analytical
framework (itself derived from Habermas).
Class relations are "structurally" generated by "asymmetries"
in the material reproduction of modes of social existence (Weber's
"life chances"). Unlike the notion of an intersubjective life-world,
that of structure exists "out of time and space", it only exists as
"the reproduced conduct of situated actors with definite
intentions and interests" (Giddens:127). Still in The German
Ideology Marx and Engels noted that
This mode of reproduction must not be viewed simply as
reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a
definite fonn of their activity, a definite way of expressing their
life, a definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they
are (cited in Clegg:40 ).
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It is in the realm of the intersubjective life-world that we
recognize the presence of others, communicate intentions, and
negotiate results. The objective and normative reproduction of
practices is referred to abstractly as "structuration": a dynamic
process whereby grammatical rules "systematically" generate the
totality of speech acts which is the spoken language
(Giddens: 121-122). (Here we approximate the distinction
between: (1) la parole/speech acts; (2) le langage/practices, a
"tongue"; and (3) la langue/language, a code with a structure of
grammatical rules [Saussure: 23-31; cf. Jako bson] ).
Historically, language exists as a systematically integrated
structure of rules (norms) which in the contingent empirical realm
of appearances approximates a structure of dominancy. A
"structure of dominancy" in Weber's theorizing (Weber:31)
represents an order of signification that underlies the surface
appearance of power, interaction and role-performance. Such a
structure of dominancy is experienced in terms of rules to which
speech actors orient their conduct. These rules are a public
phenomenon displayed in the ways in which people use language.
The concept of "rule" links the structural notions explicit in
"domination" to the actions of ordinary people. Following both
Weber and Simmel we can distinguish between the "form" of
domination and its "content", i.e., systems of rules providing
different "orders" to which people orient their speech acts.
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The critical reflections of the Frankfurt School tend to go
beyond the language of convention and seek to trace back all
"mediations" (e.g., meanings, values, institutions) to the human
operations that constitute them. In The Concept of Nature in
Marx another second generation Frankfurter Schuler, Alfred
Schmidt, demonstrates how Marx's concern is with the socially
mediated character of nature and the historical condition of its
change, rather than any genetic primacy of materialist being. The
relation between individual and nature, individual and mankind,
and individual and society is appreciated as an inherently
"mediated" one, i.e., articulated, conditioned, and modified by
man's cognitive and social authority. As finite and temporally
determined, men and women are mediating subjects, a part of the
reality of things mediated through them, and know only a socially
mediated reality .
Schmidt concludes that one must ultimately return to the
concept of practice (practical reasoning) to appreciate what Marx
meant by dialectical/historical materialism. "It is only the process
of knowing nature which can be dialectical not nature itself."
(195)
When understood critically Marxist materialism does not attempt
to assert anything of the material world in abstraction from the
practical-intellectual forms of its "appropriation" by a given
society (10).
The developing political sociology of Claus Offe further
continues -Critical Theory's attempt to confront that which is
"missing in Marx 's analysis of institutions. Offe's approach focuses
on "the action space of the capitalist institutions of political
governance" in order to discern any distinct structural limitations,
i.e., any internal rule-structures of specificity. He conceptualizes
the instit~tionalized context of class domination as a regulating
system WIth specific "selective mechanisms". These mechanisms
can ~~ visualized as a "filter system" that systematically selects
specific outcomes out of an infinite number of possibilities. They
are coordinative and repressive.
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One selective mechanism has to extract a general class interest from
particular interests of specific capitals, which themselves may be
rather limited, competing and short-sighted. This formulation of a
general class interest for the whole society may be directed in part
against some particular capital interests (Sardie-Bierman, et aI., 62).
And another "selective mechanism"
has to oppress anti-capitalist interests and conflicts. It also has to
provide possibilities for the concrete realization of the general class
interest (Ibid).
These two selective mechanisms are concealed by a third
kind: that of the ideological hegemony of a dominant political
paradigm's interpretive schemes and tacit understanding. That
ideological hegemony penetrates thought and action, and is related
to the way in which action is legitimized. The "class" nature of
the institutions of political governance is denied, and the
phenomena Marx refers to as "false consciousness" is molded.
The function of selective mechanisms embedded within the
institutions of political governance is a legitimizing one. They
operate to realize the class interests of the hegemonic power bloc
"under the name of the benefit to society as a whole." However
they do so·in a manner geared
to avoid the danger that an openly practiced class nature of the
State might lead to a polarization of class conflicts (Ibid. 63).
In Offe's political sociology the state apparatus of
decision-making and administration - is conceived as operating
within an' institutional environment of "rules of the game",
"boundaries", "limits", "parameters", and "basic logics". That
institutional context is in tum structured by the underlying mode
of _production of organized class society, and its operating
principles, exchange value and the accumulation of capital. The
c~ntral problematic, then, that Offe's approach raises is that of
deciphering the internal structures of the political scene which
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guarantee the conversion of the interests of the process of surplus
value creation into public policy.
Haberm as, [and Abedroth's] notion of the "public sphere"
should be understood as the categorical mediation between a
developing material production and the cultural organization of
human experience (i.e., norms and institutions) during the process
of the constitution of social experience. Ideally, the bourgeois
public sphere (and its truth) contained" the potential for the
universalization of a practical critique of a system of "rationality".
Yet increasingly, Habermas notes in Legitimation Crisis (70)
The public realm (Offentlichkeit) set up for effective legitimation,
has above all the function of directing attention to topical
areas-that is, of pushing other themes, problems and arguments
below the threshold of attention-and, thereby, of withholding
them from opinion-formation.
Ideally in the bourgeois public sphere, only argumentation
effectively tests the generalizability of interests. However, as the
"liberal" model of the public sphere becomes both an object of
the profit-maximizing process as well as an object of manipulation
by privileged groups, Habermas comes to see only the practice of
class struggle as redeeming the telos of the public sphere. In such
class struggle Habermas perceives the conscious
intention-however counterfactual-of a discursively grounded
consensus of participants attained through argumentation.
Habermas' concept of "social welfare state mass
"4.~~ocracy"-whiGh includes Offe's selection and exclusion
mechanisms-allows him to discover anew basis for the bourgeois
public sphere, albeit an altered one. The bourgeois public sphere
then is understood as having undergone
a rational reorganization of social and political power under the
mutual control of rival organizations committed to the public
sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with
the state and (with) each other [Knodler-Bunte: 54).
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Habermas' concept of "social welfare state mass democracy"
is one of self-regulation through the public sphere. Like
burgerliche Gesellschaft and its organizing Offentlichkeit principle,
the late capitalist Welfare State bases its legitimacy on the
unbiased opportunity for all classes to utilize the state services and
to benefit from its regulatory acts of intervention.
Habennas asserts that the generative intervention of
administrative power is now both a constitutive moment of
capitalist development and the immanent potential for the
radicalization of consciousness. In the emergent corporatism that
is advanced capitalist society, he sees the immanent potential for
the unmasking of· fundamental contradictions of capitalist
production transformed into a crisis of legitimation, and for the
reactivation of the public through possible discursive testings and
the projection of counterfactual claims. Thus, in the past decade
or so Habermas' concern turned to the "protest potential" posed
by the protest of students, scientist and intellectuals.
Some of Hab ermas, own students-Claus Offe, Bernard
Willms, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge-argue that the "social
welfare state mass democracy" model posed by Habermas is only
maintainable, as the liberal model was, at the cost of concealing
the fundamental contradictions of capitalist production and
transforming them into crises of legitimation.
Negt and Kluge expand Habermas' conception of the public
sphere beyond its bourgeois content to include the class basis in
which experience is constituted. They do so in order to discover the
foundation and principle of development for a constituting class
consciousness that could potentially oppose the organized interest.
of the bourgeois public sphere. The stress is on the need for a
theory of "organization" to be built into the dialectic of distorted
interaction and unrepressed interaction that Habermas develops.
And the public sphere is viewed in terms of repressed dialogue: the
hegemony of a 'structure of dominancy to be exploded by
dialectical thought and its teleological reconstructions and
negations.
Negt and Kluge seek to point up the difference between the
ideal of the bourgeois public sphere-the basis for its historical
claim to legitimacy-and the actual process by which the bourgeois
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public sphere became established as ~ instrument of class
determination. The concept of the public sphere need not be
understood as merely this or that institutionalized manifestation
or as one oriented essentially towards the interests in the
maximization of profit. It might refer or point the way to a
horizon of social experience which enables some
counter-interpretations of social reality, some alternate
constituting of that reality.
Negt and Kluge expand the concept o~ "organization" f~om
its traditional denotation of the "combination" of human beings
(groups, voluntary associations, political parties, trade unions) in
order to make possible the active and mediating capacity of a
constituting practical reasoning: one that formulates new
interpretations of social reality beyond bourgeois institutions, new
forms of public spheres. The concern is with the "organizing
functions of cultural objectifications and forms of
communication" in which experiences are molded, e.g., cultural
assumptions, normative attitudes, collective prejudices, values
(Knodler-Bunte.S'l-Sd}, . .
The bibliography that follows presents the scope of this
"second generation" of the Frankfurt School as well as links it to
the related theoretical advances in both analytical philosophy and
the sociology of meaning.
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